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PRINCIPLE AND UTILITY IN THE STRUCTURE
OF SECURITIES OWNERSHIP
A COMMENT ON SCHWARCZ & BENJAMIN
CARL S. BJERRE*
In Intermediary Risk in the Indirect Holding System for Securi-
ties,1 Professors Schwarcz and Benjamin take as their central moti-
vating principle the time-honored idea that nemo dat quod non habet,
or no one gives more than he or she has.  This principle, also known
as the “derivation principle” of property ownership because it main-
tains that the rights of each property owner should be derived from
the rights of the property’s previous owner,2 provides a window onto
some of the most central and intractable questions in the commercial
law field.
The nemo dat principle seemingly makes abundant and conclu-
sive common sense: how, a non-lawyer would truculently ask, could
anyone possibly give more than he or she has?  But common sense
turns out to be under-determinative in this area,3 and the answer to
the truculent question is easy: by legal fiat.  That is, the commercial
law system can enable X to give more to Y than X has, not by con-
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1. Steven L. Schwarcz & Joanna Benjamin, Intermediary Risk in the Indirect Holding
System for Securities, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 309 (2002).  As the authors note, the article
integrates and abridges others of their works.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a
Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J. 1541 (2001) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Global Economy]; JOANNA
BENJAMIN, INTERESTS IN SECURITIES: A PROPRIETARY LAW ANALYSIS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS (2000); JOANNA BENJAMIN, LEGAL RISK
MANAGEMENT IN GLOBAL SECURITIES INVESTMENT AND COLLATERAL (forthcoming 2002).
2. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 4 (2d ed. 1987); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally
Ready This Time?  The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street, COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 291, 296–97 n.6 (1994).
3. Consonant with this under-determinativeness, Schwarcz’s and Benjamin’s support for
the nemo dat principle in the context of indirect securities ownership is based on considerations,
beyond the scope of this brief commentary, that are considerably more detailed than a simple
invocation of common sense.  See Schwarcz, Global Economy, supra note 1, at 1573–77, 1580–
86.
BJERRE COMMENT_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  4:06 PM
332 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 12:331
juring additional rights out of thin air, but by expropriating some of
Z’s rights in order to include them in the package that Y gets from X.
And as I explore in detail in a forthcoming article,4 the American
commercial law system does so over and over again, in widely varying
contexts.5  (One example, salient here because Schwarcz and Benja-
min explicitly focus on it,6 is the U.C.C. provision that gives priority to
the secured creditor (Y) who takes as collateral from a securities in-
termediary (X) the securities entitlements held by an entitlement
holder (Z), even if the entitlement holder does not consent.7)  The
commercial law system’s reason for taking these steps is to foster
commerce between X and Y, by freeing Y from concerns that third
parties, such as Z, will have claims to the property that defeat Y’s.
These violations of the nemo dat principle have a common sense of
their own, one which duels with the common sense of the nemo dat
principle itself, and hence, the validity or invalidity of the principle
cannot be resolved simply by applying common sense.
Moral philosophy can hardly lay claim to being a readier prob-
lem-solver than is common sense.  The moral philosophical approach
does, however, frame the issues more sharply and, more important,
reveals the depths of what is at stake in a way that ordinary commer-
cial law scholarship often does not.  The nemo dat principle is of a
piece with the classical liberal tradition, which of course prizes indi-
vidual autonomy for its own sake, including, notably, freedom of al-
ienation.8  Thus, if the only way for Y to get more than X had is for
the law to conscript Z’s property, then protection of Z’s freedom
from non-consensual alienation calls for denying Y anything more
than X had.  (This classical liberal outlook is enshrined in the
U.C.C.’s own self-declared purposes and policies, which include ex-
panding commercial practices through “custom, usage and agreement
of the parties.”9)  By contrast, departures from the nemo dat principle
4. Carl S. Bjerre, Commerce and Community: The Redistributionist Streak in American
Commercial Law (on file with the author).
5. In addition to the priority issues discussed in the text below, examples include the void-
able title and entrusting rules for goods, the holder in due course rules for negotiable instru-
ments, the protected purchaser rules for securities in the direct holding system, the true con-
signment rules in secured transactions, and, in the indirect holding system for securities, the rule
imposing pro rata treatment on entitlement holders.
6. Schwarcz & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 325–26.
7. U.C.C. § 8-511(b) (2000) (secured creditor of a securities intermediary has priority over
entitlement holder when secured creditor has control of the financial asset).
8. The authorities here range from Locke and Kant to Robert Nozick, and are more fully
explored in Bjerre, supra note 4.
9. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
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in the interest of fostering commerce are of a piece with the utilitarian
and pragmatic philosophical traditions, which of course reject the idea
of inviolable natural-law rights and, instead, evaluate rules or actions
in light of their practical results.10
In the continuing conflict between these two philosophical tradi-
tions, Schwarcz and Benjamin have focused on an area that has been
a true stronghold for the utilitarian tradition, simply because the indi-
rect holding system for securities has an even more potentially enor-
mous practical impact than do most commercial law rules.  The richly
interlocking, complexly tiered and cross-wired nature of the indirect
holding system presents the specter of “systemic risk,” in which
problems with one intermediary can readily cause problems with
other intermediaries, and so on, potentially destabilizing the entire
system.11  For these reasons it is refreshing and laudable that Schwarcz
and Benjamin remind us of the individualistic, classical-liberally
rooted nemo dat approach even in this context, while remaining non-
doctrinaire enough to entertain utilitarian countercurrents, such as
the secured creditor priority mentioned above.
It is unclear whether Schwarcz and Benjamin would, if pressed as
a philosophical matter, align themselves generally with the classical
liberals or the utilitarians.  On one hand, they clearly see the secured
creditor priority rule as a limited departure from their starting princi-
ple of nemo dat.12  On the other hand, however, they imply a utilitar-
ian bent more generally by, among other things, expressing reserva-
tions about a conflict-of-laws approach to the intermediary risk
problem (such as that currently proceeding under the auspices of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law13) on the grounds
that such an approach might sometimes point to a jurisdiction that
does not award priority to secured creditors.14  To notice this ambiva-
lence is not to criticize it, for as I note above and elsewhere,15 the
10. The authorities here, too, are wide-ranging, from the Skeptics through Hume and the
Chicago-school law and economics analysts.  This tradition is, usually tacitly, the predominant
viewpoint in commercial law scholarship today.
11. Jim Rogers accordingly calls U.C.C. Article 8’s work on controlling systemic risk “part
[of] what might be described as ‘Armageddon planning’ for the financial system.”  James S.
Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1436 (1996).
Rogers was the Reporter for the Article 8 Drafting Committee.
12. Schwarcz & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 325–26.
13. Id. at 316; Sandra M. Rocks & B. Shea Owens, Survey of International Commercial
Law Developments: 1999-2000, 56 BUS. LAW. 1867, 1874–75 (2001).
14. Schwarcz & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 329–30; see also id. at 320–21 (discussing the
indirect holding system itself in terms of a utilitarian framework).
15. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
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same ambivalence pervades much of the body of American commer-
cial law.
